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Petitioners, a white woman and a Negro man, instituted a mandamus
proceeding against the county clerk seeking to compel the issuance of a mar-
riage license. Held, that the writ prayed for must issue. The miscegenation
statute I invoked by the respondent was invalid because it violated the provi-
siols of the Federal Constitution regarding "the equal protection of the laws" 2
and "the free exercise" of religion,8 and because it was too uncertain to be
enforceable, in that there was a lack of provision for the application of the statute
to persons of mixed ancestry. Perez et al. v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948)
(4-3 decision).
Prior to this decision, miscegenation statutes, 4 though frequently attacked,
had been upheld consistently.5 This result was based upon the premise that the
marriage relation is an institution of society, subject to regulation and control
under the police power of the state in the interest of good order and the public
welfare.6 This view was supported in the dissenting opinion. But there have
been few recent cases involving miscegenation statutes, and some of these
have been decided upon precedent.7 For this reason the majority believed it
1. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 69 (Deering, Supp. 1947). ", . . and no license may be issued
authorizing the marriage of a white person with a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian, or member
of the Malay race; . . ." This section implements CAL. CIv., CODE § 60 (Deering, 1941).
"All marriages of white persons with Negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay race,
or mulattoes are illegal and void." Amendments had been made to these sections as
recently as 1945 and 1933, respectively.
2. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
3. U. S. CONST. AMEND. 1. With regard td the contention of the petitioners, both
Catholics, that the statute denied them the sacrament of matrimony and thereby prohibits
the free exercise of their religion, the court held that the state may not impose this
restriction under its power to regulate the performance of acts in the exercise of religion
as in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) (when necessary to prevent acts
which would incite violence and breaches of the peace), and Reynolds v. United States,
98 U. S. 145 (1878) (prevention of "actions which are in violation of social 'duties or
subversive of good order"), because it is discriminatory and irrational. This was
especially emphasized in the concurring opinion.
4. RAols, PI1RONISTRY, KEEPING OUR BLOOD PURE 92, n.7 (1933), lists thirty states
in which Negroes may not marry white persons.
5. E.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U. S. 583 (1882) ; Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d
120 (C. C. A. 10th 1944) ; State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1890). Almost all
other decisions have been in state courts. See 35 Am. Jur., Marriage §§ 10, 12, 146; 36 Am.
Jur., Mikcegenation § 3; 55 C. J. S., Marriage § 15.
6. In Mayhard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888), the Court said on page 213: "It par-
takes more of the character of an institution regulated and controlled by public authority,
upon principles of public policy for the benefit of the community." The Supreme Court of
Florida recently termed the state's power to regulate the marriage status "plenary" in
Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So.2d. 419, 421 (Fla. 1948). See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
145 (1878). See note 5 supra.
7. E.g., Stevens v. United States. in pra.
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appropriate to 're-examine the problem in the light of more recent racial
relations decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
As a preliminary step, the majority, relying on certain language used in
Meyer v. Nebraska 8 and Skinner v. Oklahoma,9 adopted the proposition that
marriage is a "fundamental right." 10 As such it comes under the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and must not be infringed by restrictions upon
the scope of the individual's choice except by the use of redsonable means to
obtain an important social objective, such as the prevention of marriages that
are socially daigerous because of physical disability.1 1 However, the court
rejected the attempt to show the statute to be within this exception.' 2 A
distinction is drawn between this statute and similar statutes which express a
public policy in prohibiting polygamy because of its supposed anti-social
propensities.' s
The crux of this decision, however, seems to lie in the interpretation of
the "equal protection" clause. The court discarded the construction to be
found in many of the cases to the effect that there is no discrimination and
denial of equal protection if the statute applies alike to both whites and
Negroes. 4 It adopted another, based upon McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry.,15 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,16 and Shelley v. Kraemer 17 and
8. 262 U. S. 390.(1923), where the Court said: "Without doubt, it ("liberty" as used
in the Fourteenth Amendment) denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint 'but
also the right of the individual ... to marry...." Id. at 339.
9. 316 U. S. 535 (1942), where the Court said: "We are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541.
10. Cf. Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 54 Pac. 143 (1898).
11. Cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927) (statute providing for sterilization of
mental defectives upheld); Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 61 At. 604 (1905) (statute
prohibiting marriage of epileptic and making it a criminal offense held not to be in
violation of state constitution).
12. "The categorical statement that non-Caucasians are inherently physically inferior
is without scientific proof. In recent years scientists have attached great weight to the fact
that their segregation in a generally inferior environment greatly increases their liability
to physical ailments. In any event, generalizations based on race are untrustworthy in view
of the great variations among members of the same race .... If this premise were carried
to its logical conclusion, non-Caucasians who are now precluded from marrying
Caucasians on physical grounds would also be precluded from marrying among themselves
on the same grounds." Perez et al. v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 23-24 (Cal. 1948).
13. Reynolds v. United States, supra; Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333 (1890).
14. E.g., Pace v. Alabama, supra; Stevens v. United States, supra; In re Paquet's
Estate, 101 Ore. 393, 200 Pac. 911 (1921).
15. "It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws,..." 235
U. S. 151, 161-162 (1914).
16, "Here, petitioner's right was a personal one. It was as an individual that he was
entitled to the equal protection of the laws, .... " 305 U. S. 337, 351 (1938).
17. "Respondents urge, however, that since the state courts stand ready to enforce
restrictive covenants excluding white persons from the ownership or occupancy of
property covered by such agreements, enforcement of covenants excluding colored persons
may not be deemed a denial of equal protection of the laws to the colored persons who are
thereby affected. This contention does not bear scrutiny. . . . The rights created by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual
The rights established are personal rights. If is, therefore, no answer to these petitioners to
say that the courts may also be induced to deny white persons rights of ownership and
occupancy on the ground of race or color. Equal protection of the laws is not achieved
through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." 68 Sup. Ct. 836,846 (1948).
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augmented by the recent expressions in Railway Mail Ass'n'v. Cors 18 and
Oyama v. California,'9 requiring that the constitutionality of state action be
tested according to whether the rights of an individual are restricted because
of his race. Such a construction makes it doubtful whether the "equal protec-
tion" clause would permit a statute involving a racial classification to be sus-
tained, except under circumstances similar to those in Hirabayashi v. United
States.
20
While the decision will have no drastic repercussions on its facts, since
few will avail themselves of the opportunity to enter into miscegenous mar-
riages, its significance lies in the fact that if this interpretation of the "equal
protection" clause be correct, the question is raised as to the future of other
types of segregation recognized to date.2' It would seem that the door is being
opened to further application of this interpretation to public laws dealing with
the more common and consequential segregational problems. 2
CRIMINAL LAW-INDEFINITE SUSPENSION IN IMPOSITION
OF SENTENCE
Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of possessing and
selling lottery tickets. On December 7, 1945, he was adjudged guilty, and
the court ordered "that the passing of sentence herein be continued from
day to day and from term to term until disposed of." Petitioner was there-
upon released. Subsequently, on July 13, 1948, two years and seven months
after the imposition of sentence was suspended, he was rearrested and, six
days later, was sentenced to three years at hard labor. The court, before
passing sentence, denied a motion of the petitioner that he be allowed a
hearing to show that he did not violate any agreement or understanding'
made at the time of suspension. Held, appeal dismissed, since no conditions
were imposed at the original trial, the hearing was not required. Pinkney v.
State, 37 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1948).
Suspension of sentence cases must be closely scrutinized, for the courts
have indiscriminately used this phrase in two situations; suspension of
18. "A judicial determination that such legislation (N. Y. STATE LAOR RmATlOuS
AcT, N. Y. CoNsoL. LAWS, c. 31, Art. 20) violated the Fourteenth Amendment would be a
distortion of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was adopted to prevent
state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color." 326
U. S. 88, 94 (1945).
19. "There remains the question whether discrimination between citizens on the basis
of their racial descent, . . . is justifiable. Here we start with the proposition that only the
most exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination on that basis in the face of the
equal protection clause.. . ." 332 U. S. 633, 646 (1948)..
20. 320 U. S. 81 (1943) (exigencies of war).
21. See, e.g., McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., supra (segregation on railroad
trains) ; Missouri ex rt. Gaines v. Canada, supra (segregation in schools).
22. See note 21 supra.
